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Brian Trenor 





Although President Gerald Ford’s assertion that “there is no Soviet domination of Eastern 
Europe” was certainly the most dramatic moment of the 1976 second presidential debate, Poland 
had barely been mentioned in the campaign until that moment. Candidate Jimmy Carter’s 
rhetoric concerning Eastern Europe had been vague and unfocused. In the weeks following the 
second debate, however, the Carter team fleshed out its Eastern Europe policy with the ready 
help of Carter’s key foreign policy advisor, Polish-born Zbigniew Brzezinski. This essay 
examines the evolution of Carter’s policy toward Poland, which Carter first fully articulated at a 
Pulaski Day dinner in Chicago on October 10, 1976. In a dramatic change in policy, Carter 
stressed human rights, Radio Free Europe, cultural and economic exchanges, and a bilateral 
relationship with Poland that treated it as a semi-independent power. This four-fold policy would 
not only sharpen the distinctions between Carter and Ford, but also later provide the foundation 
of Carter’s policy toward Poland when he was president.1 
Ford’s policy focused on Eastern Europe as a region, and paid relatively little attention to 
the individual countries such as Poland. It was mediated through Moscow, and US-Soviet 
relations were overriding of any other concerns toward Eastern Europe. Nixon and Ford had 
dealt with Eastern Europe primarily in an economic sense, as Raymond Garthoff explains: 
“improved terms for trade and economic relations were seen as the principal incentive the U.S. 
government could provide the countries of Eastern Europe.” Moscow saw this trend positively, 
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as it relaxed its own economic troubles. By the mid 1970s the United States had all but 
abandoned the desire of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to seek a “liberalizing” 
influence in Eastern Europe policy; priorities like MBFN, CSCE, and SALT became more 
imminent and important, and Soviet cooperation was necessary to achieve these ends. In 1975, 
the major powers signed the Helsinki Final Act, which contained three sections, or “baskets:” 
Basket One accepted the current division of Europe and the inviolability of borders, Basket Two 
called for economic cooperation between the communist and capitalist camps, and Basket Three 
called for the protection of human rights, including the right to emigration, speech, and thought. 
Most observers, including the White House, State Department, and the Kremlin, paid little heed 
to the human rights portions. In such a light, Radio Free Europe broadcasts or White House 
receptions of dissidents like Solzhenitsyn became liabilities. Congress kept RFE’s budget static, 
and dissidents, much to their dismay, found turned backs in Washington. Because Baskets One 
and Two contained virtually every condition they had desired, the Soviet Union considered the 
Accords a diplomatic triumph. Still, Helsinki was a watershed moment for the dissident 
movement, which would begin to form watch groups to monitor violations of the human rights 
provisions. Over time, some in the United States would also come to see the Helsinki Accords as 
a means through which to indirectly contest the continued division of Europe.2 
The most famous formulation of policy on Eastern Europe during the Ford years was the 
Sonnenfeldt Doctrine. The doctrine viewed the division of Europe into East and West as an 
unfortunate fact of life. Given this, nationalist uprisings by Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, and other 
East Europeans were seen as destabilizing, and therefore the United States should not encourage 
dissidents. Instead, a more “organic” relationship between the Warsaw Pact states and Moscow 
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would create more stability. Sonnenfeldt recognized this would expose the United States to the 
charge that it was complicit in “helping the Soviets maintain their control over Eastern Europe,” 
but he argued there was no alternative if the United States wanted a stable Europe. The East 
Europeans would have to overcome their “romantic inclinations” to “break out of the Soviet 
straitjacket.”3 
This was explosive stuff never intended to be made public, but it was leaked in March 
1976 to the investigative journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak and immediately went 
viral. The Sonnenfeldt Doctrine together with the Helsinki Accords made the topic of Eastern 
Europe immeasurably more controversial. What role should the United States have in the region? 
Most commentators had an opinion on the subject, usually a very strong one. Even Radio 
Warsaw found the doctrine alarming, lamenting the perceived quid pro quo of, “We have written 
off Eastern Europe; you should now write off Western Europe.” Brzezinski later noted in an 
interview, “It did reflect this notion of condominium…let’s settle for what we can.” Brzezinski 
had opposed such a viewpoint for much of his career; while at Columbia University, he had 
written speeches for the Kennedy Administration urging “peaceful engagement” toward Eastern 
Europe in order to slowly wean it from the Soviet empire through, among other means, cultural 
contact and the radio services.4 This would greatly inform Brzezinski’s advice to Carter, which 
would in turn spur an important shift in the candidate’s thinking. 
 Prior to the debates, Brzezinski advised Carter to refrain from criticizing the Helsinki 
                                                           
3 “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine; Discussion at Chiefs of Mission Conference on U.S. Policy in Eastern Europe, December 
13-14, 1975,” Digital National Security Archives, Kissinger Transcripts, Item KTO1850, pg. 47-69. 
4 Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), pg. 664-665; Robert Novak, 
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Accords as a whole and call instead for Soviet compliance with the Basket Three provisions of 
Helsinki, which for the first time gave the United States the right “to insist on respect for human 
rights without this constituting interference in the internal affairs of communist states. 
Accordingly, this is a considerable asset for us, and you should hammer away at the proposition 
that the Republicans have been indifferent to this opportunity.”5 Carter had initially criticized the 
Helsinki Accords, but by 1976 he agreed with Brzezinski’s line of thinking. Carter and 
Brzezinski were not insincere in their thinking, and genuinely believed their approach was in the 
national interest. At the same time, they were not opposed to seizing a political opportunity to 
hammer their rival. This allowed Carter to “seize the optimistic vision” from Ford, casting 
himself as “a man of the future” and a champion of American values abroad.6 
This trend would be exploited most effectively at the second presidential debate, held in 
San Francisco on October 6, 1976. Whereas the first debate had focused exclusively on domestic 
policy, the second would turn to foreign affairs. The stakes for both sides were high. Carter’s 
lead was slipping. He had held a thirty-three point lead in the Gallup polls following the 
Democratic Convention in July, but as the second debate drew near the race had narrowed to a 
statistical dead heat.7 
Brzezinski and Carter sat down to breakfast the morning of October 5 to prepare for the 
debate the next day. Carter, aware of his evaporating lead, “was not in a good mood.” According 
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7 Patrick G. Vaughan, “Zbigniew Brzezinski and the Helsinki Final Act,” in Leopold Nuti, The crisis of détente in 
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to according to historian Patrick Vaughan, who has had access to Zbigniew Brzezinski’s private 
papers, Brzezinski was Carter’s only advisor for the debate. By then, he had clearly become 
Carter’s key foreign policy aide; all the other advisers were told to “clear it with Zbig.” Zbigniew 
Brzezinski’s hand can be detected behind many of Carter’s speeches.8 Brzezinski urged the 
Democratic candidate to argue “that the major issue confronting us is the absence of effective 
Presidential leadership.” By putting Ford on the defensive Carter could neutralize the advantage 
of incumbency. By charging Ford had let the Soviets get the best of détente by had neglected 
human rights, Carter would assault “Kissinger’s worldview from both conservative and liberal 
angles.”9 
This preparation would pay major dividends when, about halfway through the debate, 
journalist Max Frankel asked President Ford whether detente was allowing the Soviets to get 
“the better of us.” Defending the Helsinki accords, Ford boldly asserted, “There is no Soviet 
domination of Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford Administration.” Pressed for 
clarification, Ford kept digging, claiming he didn’t believe that the Yugoslavs, Romanians, and 
Poles “consider themselves dominated by the Soviet Union.” Sensing an opportunity, Carter 
leapt to the attack, charging: 
[Helsinki] may have been a good agreement in the beginning, but we have failed to 
enforce the so-called Basket 3 part…The Soviet Union is still jamming Radio Free 
Europe…We’ve also seen a very serious problem with the so-called Sonnenfeldt 
document which, apparently, Mr. Ford has just endorsed, which said that there is an 
organic linkage between the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union. And I 
would like to see Mr. Ford convince the Polish-Americans and the Czech-Americans and 
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the Hungarian-Americans in this country that those countries don’t live under the 
domination and supervision of the Soviet Union behind the Iron Curtain.10 
 
Carter had hammered Ford’s entire Eastern Europe policy point-by-point. He had also 
emphasized the themes of his campaign: unlike President Ford, he would never engage in secret 
diplomacy and would always stand up to the Soviets. James Naughton of the New York Times 
reported an “audible intake of air” from the crowd; Ford’s policy advisor Brent Scowcroft, 
watching the debate backstage, was said to have “gone white.” Carter’s strategist Hamilton 
Jordan exclaimed “He did it! Jimmy cleaned his clock!” No less than William F. Buckley Jr. 
called Ford’s answer “the ultimate Polish joke.” For several more days, Ford would try to 
backtrack before finally acknowledging his mistake. Suddenly Eastern Europe had jumped to the 
forefront of campaign topics.11 
  Brzezinski did not want to “overplay the subject,” writing in a memo to campaign staff 
that Carter should remind audiences “that already back in March Carter addressed himself to the 
question of Eastern Europe, and warned of the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, 
etc.” By reiterating the language of the earlier speech, Carter “would show that he is not merely 
exploiting Ford’s mistake but speaking out of conviction.”12 In the following weeks, the Carter 
team worked to sharpen their rhetoric on Eastern Europe, hammering home on the importance of 
Helsinki compliance and addressing the problems of individual nations, especially Poland. 
On October 10, four days after the debate, Jimmy Carter attended a Pulaski Day dinner 
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(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); William F. Buckley, Jr., “Mr. Ford’s Polish Joke,” National 
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held by the Polish community in Chicago. Following Brzezinski’s playbook, Carter reminded the 
crowd he had declared seven months earlier that “Eastern Europe must never, and can never be a 
stable region until the Eastern European countries regain their independence,” and that détente 
depended on “recognizing the legitimate aspirations” of Poland and Eastern Europe. However, 
this was not quite what Carter had said in March, and the difference, although slight, is 
revealing.13 
In the earlier speech, Carter had said “we should remember that Eastern Europe is not an 
area of stability and it will not become such until the Eastern European countries regain their 
independence and become part of a larger cooperative European framework.” By October, the 
key verbs shifted from the neutral “is not” and “will not become” to the much more active idea 
that Eastern Europe must and can never be stable until it becomes independent. The latter 
language is far more subversive and would foreshadow the policy that toward Poland that Carter 
pursued as president. In this speech, Carter drew together the disparate strands of his Polish 
policy for the first time and presented the overarching program as a whole. Carter intended to not 
only cooperate but also compete with the Soviet Union, and he did not see these as mutually 
exclusive. To this end, Carter told the Chicago Poles that while he preferred cooperation with the 
Soviet Union to a cold war, he would take firm “steps to show that we do care about freedom in 
Eastern Europe.”14 These steps comprise the four main themes of Carter’s policy toward Poland. 
First, Carter sought the USSR’s increased compliance with the Helsinki Accord’s 
guarantee of human rights and freedom of movement. Carter called for America to be 
“constantly concerned about the preservation of human rights throughout the world” and pledged 
he would do nothing as president “to give the slightest indication that we will ever accept 
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permanent Soviet domination over countries that want to be free. And you can depend on that.” 
Carter’s speechwriter during the campaign, Patrick Anderson, explained the effectiveness of 
utilizing human rights, as “liberals liked human rights because it involved political freedom and 
getting liberals out of jails in dictatorships, and conservatives liked it because it involved 
criticisms of Russia.” This was not a new idea, and extended the theme Carter had developed 
throughout the campaign, particularly the general campaign.15 Promoting human rights was not 
just a moral policy for Carter; it was also an aggressive component of détente. At a meeting of 
the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on March 15, 1976. Carter argued that détente, as 
practiced by Ford, was skewed in favor of the Soviets, providing: 
the benefits of the Helsinki Accords without the requirement of living up to the human 
rights provisions which form an integral part of it. This is not the road to peace but the 
bitter deception of the American people…It is in our interest to try to make détente 
broader and more reciprocal. Détente can be an instrument for long-term peaceful change 
within the Communist system, as well as in the rest of the world.16 
 
This was the critical difference in Carter’s thinking: détente was a means not only for 
arms reduction and trade but “long-term peaceful change” for Eastern Europe. Carter charged 
that Eastern Europe was inherently unstable because of its artificial division from Western 
Europe and because of the communist governments that had been imposed on the Poles and 
other Eastern Europeans against their will. This was a clear repudiation of the Sonnenfeldt 
Doctrine. “Carter was killing the Soviets with kindness,” Brzezinski said, “because he was 
talking about engagement, human rights, disarmament – but the Soviets knew what he was 
talking about.” It was becoming hard to separate the strategic from the humanitarian with regards 
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to the human rights rhetoric.17 The emphasis on human rights was also influential within Eastern 
Europe and particularly Poland. Historian Bronislaw Geremek, a key member of Solidarity, 
recalled Brzezinksi’s stress on the Helsinki Final Act as crucial: 
It was extremely important to us that Zbigniew Brzezinski…supported Basket Three. The 
dissidents, until this time, had this feeling of being marginal, and had no legal reference. 
But with the Helsinki agreement, and especially this “third basket,” we could say to our 
government: “You signed it – if you signed the agreement, we are now asking about the 
agreements on freedom of information, freedom of expression, travels and so on.” So 
Brzezinski’s role in emphasizing the third basket was crucial, and this, I have no doubt, 
played a key role in the implosion of the Soviet empire.18 
 
Human rights were a clear focus for Carter with regard to Eastern Europe. Among these 
rights was the freedom of information, which was closely linked to one of Brzezinski’s signature 
causes: Radio Free Europe. 
In his second step, Carter detailed, “we must insist, soundly, that the Soviet Union, as 
agreed to in the Helsinki Agreement, cease jamming Radio Free Europe and Radio 
Liberty…there has to be access to those who live in Poland from the free world.” In his view, the 
Ford administration had failed to exploit the enormous potential of these radio services. They 
were, in Carter’s opinion, among the most powerful tools at America’s disposal.19 Radio Free 
Europe was highly respected in Poland as one of the only credible, independent sources of news 
and programming. The opposition listened openly and the party clandestinely, but RFE wielded a 
power in Poland that the domestic news organs envied.20 Accordingly, Carter stressed its role as 
                                                           
17 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part One, pg. 116, 546, 693; Samuel P. Huntington, Political 
Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pg. 335; Alexander J. Groth, “The 
Institutional Myth: Huntington’s Order Revisited,” The Review of Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (April 1979), pg. 218; 
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20 Lechoslaw Gawlikowski, “The Audience to Western Broadcasting to Poland During the Cold War,” in A. Ross 
Johnson and R. Eugene Parta, eds., Cold War Broadcasting: Impact on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe: A 
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Trenor 10 
 
a vital part of his human rights policy. 
Carter called these radio services the “most valuable instruments our nation has for this 
purpose.” He saw them as important American foreign policy tools, in contrast to those who 
sought a more independent role for the radios similar to that of BBC. By 1976, he was sharply 
critical of the decay of the services under Ford. VOA had “been entangled in a web of political 
restrictions imposed by the Department of State, which seriously limit its effectiveness,” 
according to a Carter campaign position paper on the radio services. Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty suffered from similar restrictions. Carter argued that the State Department had 
capitulated to Soviet protests. Carter charged, “for nearly a decade, our foreign policy leadership 
in Washington has ignored repeated warnings that the broadcast strength of Radio Free Europe 
and Radio Liberty is growing progressively weaker owing to jamming and inadequate transmitter 
power.” Funds for new technology and stronger transmitters dried up, and Soviet jamming 
enveloped the broadcasts in a hissing torrent of static.21 
In contrast, Carter sought revitalization and expansion of RFE and the other radio 
agencies. “If détente with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe is to have real 
meaning,” a campaign position paper charged, “we must work toward a freer flow of information 
and ideas for those countries.” At the meeting of Chicago Poles, Carter stressed that Radio Free 
Europe gave East Europeans more than just news, it gave them hope.22 RFE was particularly 
suited to the task because unlike the Voice of America, it included commentary and analysis of 
the news which provided a vital counterpoint to state-operated news. For Carter, the radio 
services were simultaneously a tool of the cold war and of human rights: 
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The radios are more than mere transmitters of information. They are the symbol of the 
U.S. commitment to peaceful change in Eastern Europe and a sign of continued 
engagement in Europe’s future. If we remove the uncertainties that have arisen around 
our commitment to the radios…the American people can once again take pride in the fact 
that their foreign policy is an accurate reflection of their character and moral heritage.23 
 
In a remarkable, succinct fashion, the brief turned the conventional wisdom on its head, 
recasting Radio Free Europe not as propaganda but as a symbol of the new transparent 
government. Carter appealed to classic American values while at the same time throwing down a 
major intellectual gauntlet. His “commitment to peaceful change” in Eastern Europe was as 
direct an assault on the Yalta-Helsinki “status quo” as one can imagine short of deeming the 
Soviet Union the evil empire. In short, the radios would be the chosen instrument through which 
the American commitment to human rights and the liberation of Eastern Europe would be 
expressed. 
The third prong of Carter’s policy would be to encourage the existing economic and 
cultural ties to Poland. The candidate pledged to work “for an expanded network of human and 
commercial ties between the countries of the East and the countries of the West.” That is, Carter 
would expand trade and cultural ties with Poland and other eastern European countries.24 By 
1976, Poland exported $1 billion to the West and imported $500 million. US-Polish relations 
were also marked by an array of cultural, educational, scientific, and technological exchanges. 
The Poles welcomed the opportunity for investment and training, while the Americans made 
every effort to expose Poland to the Western way of life. Carter argued that “expanding two-way 
trade” would help Poland cope with its serious economic difficulties.25  
These had been dramatically on display during the campaign when the Polish government 
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25 CIA Report, “Soviet and East European Relations with the US and the West,” November 1, 1976, CIA FOIAA 
Reading Room (online), pg. 1; The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part One, pg. 113, 266. 
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had announced on June 25, 1976 that it would raise food prices, which had caused rioting in 
several locales. The government rescinded the price hikes, but not before the world had 
witnessed the unrest simmering in Poland.26  
Communist countries could gain access to American markets and credits through the 
fourth prong of Carter’s Eastern Europe policy: direct bilateral relations between the United 
States and East European countries, rather than the previous reliance on a Washington-Moscow 
relationship.27 At a conference in Kansas City, Missouri on October 16, 1976, Carter said of 
Eastern Europe, “I would cease to treat them as a uniform block which has been the attitude of 
this administration. I would renounce immediately the so-called Sonnenfeldt Doctrine that says 
there is an organic link between these individual countries and the Soviet Union.” Instead, Carter 
proposed dealing directly with the east European countries, bypassing Moscow whenever 
possible.28 At a meeting of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on March 15, 1976, Carter 
argued, “Our vision must be of a more pluralistic world and not of a Communist monolith. We 
must pay more attention to China and to Eastern Europe.”29 Carter’s view of the world was more 
multipolar, and he wanted to move away from an obsessive focus on bipolar US-USSR relations. 
The US-USSR relationship was the most important relationship, but not the only relationship of 
importance. In wanting to focus on other relationships in their own right, rather than through the 
prism of US-USSR relations, Carter was forging something new in American foreign policy with 
respect to his predecessor. This would have a great impact on relations toward Eastern Europe 
and Poland. Unlike the other three sections of Carter’s Polish policy, this theme of bilateral 
                                                           
26 Anthony Lewis, “Echoes of Helsinki,” The New York Times, August 2, 1976; Burton Levinson, “Helsinki 
Agreement: One Year Later,” Los Angeles Times, August 8, 1976; “Poland Announces Big Food-Price Rise,” The 
New York Times, June 25, 1976; “Poland Cancels Food Prices Rises After Disorders,” The New York Times, June 
26, 1976. 
27 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part One, pg. 116. 
28 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part Two, pg. 1004-5. 
29 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part One, pg. 117. 
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relations was a process, rather than a policy. It expressed how a Carter administration would see 
Poland, not necessarily what policies it would advance. Poland’s party leader Edward Gierek 
welcomed this because of the prestige that it would bring not only Poland but also him as its 
leader. However, bilateral relations would serve as a means to tie Poland into a closer 
relationship with the United States, and therefore increase the costs to Poland for actions the 
United States would be unhappy with, such as the renewed repression of dissidents. By shifting 
to a direct dialogue with Poland and the other nations in the region, the United States would be 
better able to reward regimes that liberalized or observed the Basket Three provisions of the 
Helsinki accords.30 
Taken together, these four policies sketched out the relationship with Eastern Europe that 
Carter proposed: if the eastern European governments upheld their Helsinki obligations, the 
United States would pursue a bilateral relationship that would lead to increased credits and 
cultural exchanges. It was a more aggressive approach than that pursued by Ford. It stressed 
competing ideologically while cooperating politically and economically.  
Ford’s famous gaffe at the second debate served as the impetus for Carter to adopt a 
sharper criticism of the Ford Administration’s policy toward Eastern Europe. What was initially 
a chance to score points with the electorate became an opportunity for the Carter campaign to 
develop his policy. An outline for action was sketched that would be translated directly into 
policy toward Poland during the incoming Carter Administration. Centered in the human rights 
provisions of the Helsinki Accords, Carter sought to encourage human rights, particularly 
through Radio Free Europe and with an array of cultural, educational, and scientific exchanges. 
This was accompanied by a new stress on bilateral relations with Poland to encourage the 
communist state’s good behavior. 
                                                           
30 The Presidential Campaign, 1976, Volume One, Part Two, pg. 711, 1021. 
Trenor 14 
 
Each aspect of the proposed Polish policy was enacted in the next four years. Human 
rights and Helsinki would become a rallying cry for the Carter Administration and the Polish 
opposition, which became stronger each year. Radio Free Europe and the radio agencies would 
be an important part of this process, and were all strengthened during the Carter Administration. 
They became a vital part of the daily life for the political underground in Poland. The policy 
toward the radio services in particular would bear the influence of Zbigniew Brzezinski; Polish 
policy was his brainchild throughout the Carter Administration. Agricultural and technological 
credits boosted Poland’s struggling economy, while the exchange of personnel further facilitated 
the exchange of ideas. Partially as a result of the approach of the new administration, Poland’s 
reaction to a wave of human rights activism in early 1977 would not be as severe as that of many 
of its neighbors. In 1980, the Polish opposition that had drawn together formed the powerful and 
influential Solidarity trade union. Although some of the policies were more successful than 
others, together they constituted the major themes of the next four years of U.S.-Polish relations. 
It was a policy that explicitly rejected the Sonnenfeldt doctrine and aggressively sought to 
liberalize the Polish social, economic, and political systems. While it was but one of many 
factors, it is reasonable to assume that Jimmy Carter’s policy toward Poland – his promotion of 
human rights, Radio Free Europe, trade and cultural ties, and independence from Moscow – 
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